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Collection of live coral for the marine aquarium trade has increased significantly in
recent years, causing concerns over the ecological implications of this activity for
the source regions. The Spermonde Archipelago off Southwest Sulawesi is one of the
four major ornamental coral collection sites in Indonesia, the country supplying most
corals in the trade. Management of the fishery remains ineffective, and overharvesting
is widespread. Conservation strategies for marine resources increasingly emphasize the
socioeconomic dimensions of resource use, yet little information is available on the
livelihoods of fishermen involved in the ornamental fishery. Here, a first analysis of the
livelihoods of coral fishermen in the Spermonde Archipelago is presented, along with
a discussion of possibilities for future management interventions. The reef fishery of
the study area is characterized by a high diversity of target organisms, with none of
the fishermen relying exclusively on ornamental corals for income. Moreover, fishermen
are organized in a tightly knit web of patron–client relationships, leaving little scope
for them to initiate changes in livelihood strategies. The patron–client system emerged
as a key institution of the fishery. In order to support sustainable marine resource use,
management policies should simultaneously target the fishermen and their patrons as
well as the regional coral trade network, broadening the livelihood portfolio of island
communities and improving the regulation of the associated trade network.
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Introduction
Since the widely publicized coral bleaching event in 1998, the plight of coral reefs has
increasingly come into public focus, fueled by scientists’ predictions of widespread coral
loss due to global climate change within the coming decades (e.g., Hoegh-Guldberg 1999;
Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). Localized human activities are also increasingly impacting
reefs so that over 60% of reefs worldwide are now immediately threatened by local activities
such as (over)fishing and coastal development. These threats are particularly severe in
Southeast Asia, where nearly 95% of the reefs are threatened, causing widespread concern
over their conservation (Burke et al. 2011). At the same time, human use of coral reef
resources has been steadily increasing. A case in point is the collection of live animals for
the marine ornamental trade, which over the past three decades, in the wake of technological
advances that increased the ability of hobbyists to maintain marine animals in captivity, has
developed into a multi-million-dollar industry.
The collection of marine ornamental species has become an important economic factor
in some source regions, but detailed information on its contribution to the livelihoods of
coastal communities is largely missing (Wabnitz et al. 2003; Watson 2000). Today, an
estimated 40 to 46 million animals are traded per year, worth an approximate 200 to 330
million USD. Stony corals make up about one quarter of the specimens traded (Wabnitz
et al. 2003). Over 90% of the corals traded originate in Indonesia, the country with the
largest area of threatened reefs worldwide (Burke et al. 2011; Jones 2008). The collection
of stony corals can have considerable local impacts, altering the reef community structure
and causing decreases in live coral cover. This has led to concerns over the sustainability
of stony coral collection, and to the listing of all stony corals under Appendix II of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The latter requires
that their international trade be regulated to ensure that it is not detrimental to the species
(Harriott 2003; Ross 1984). Until now, the overwhelming majority of ornamentals are
collected from the wild: according to Wabnitz et al. (2003), captive bred and reared marine
species make up just 1–2% of the global trade. Efforts to develop captive cultivation have
been limited by biological and socioeconomic feasibility constraints such as difficulties
in feed supply and larval rearing, lack of knowledge on life histories of target species,
lack of low-tech culture methods and appropriate handling, limited financial and technical
assistance, and elite capture in source regions such as Indonesia (Job 2005; Moorhead and
Zeng 2010; Pomeroy and Balboa 2004).
It is widely accepted today that successful marine conservation requires the consid-
eration of the socioeconomic dimensions of resource use, including users’ priorities (e.g.,
Lundquist and Granek 2005; Norse and Crowder 2005). Management interventions aiming
at a diversification of livelihoods, such as supplemental livelihood programs, are frequently
proposed as parts of coral reef conservation strategies (e.g., Gillet et al. 2008). A case
in point is the development of marine aquaculture, or mariculture, with its potential to
diversify fisherfolk’s livelihoods, to reduce pressure on local coral reef resources and to
alleviate poverty in local fishing communities. Mariculture of animals popular with aquar-
ists is increasingly called for to relieve pressure on coral reefs, particularly with respect to
harvesting live animals for the ornamental trade (Parks, Pomeroy, and Balboa 2003). How-
ever, in order to establish to which extent options such as aquaculture are an alternative to
fishing, factors such as available assets, income-generating activities, and attitudes toward
these have to be considered (Crawford 2002; Miyata and Manatunge 2004; Sievanen et al.
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2005). More often than not, socioeconomic aspects are the decisive factor determining the
success of ecologically well-designed marine conservation efforts (Sale et al. 2005).
The sustainable livelihoods framework, which analyses human access to physical,
natural, human, financial, and social capital (Scoones 1998; DFID 1999), constitutes a
suitable analytical framework to assess the asset base and income portfolio of coastal
communities (Allison and Ellis 2001). Livelihood diversification has been advocated as a
key strategy to decrease vulnerability in the face of uncertainty, which can, for instance,
stem from dependence on resources that are subject to considerable fluctuations (Ellis
2000). Reviews of rural agricultural household livelihood strategies stress the importance
of diversifying income generation activities to support the livelihoods of rural families in
developing countries (Ellis 1998; 2000; Niehof 2004). Studies from the Western Pacific
suggest that diversification into non-fishing activities constitutes an important strategy for
coastal communities (Cinner, Marnane, and McClanahan 2005; Turner et al. 2007). In
contrast to the vast number of studies carried out on poor rural households in agricultural
systems, research that focuses on livelihood strategies of fisherfolk households in tropical
regions is still limited. Even fewer studies to date deal with the livelihoods of ornamental
fishermen (Watson 2000).
In this article, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current livelihoods of fishers
engaged in the ornamental coral fishery of the Spermonde Archipelago, South Sulawesi,
Indonesia. This area has emerged as one of the major collection areas for the international
coral trade in recent decades. Local attitudes, perceptions, and networks related to the
fishery are examined, and implications for management options are discussed. Following
an analysis of the development and organization of the fishery and of the livelihood assets
available to its various actors, we discuss local rationalities surrounding the option to adopt
small-scale mariculture as an alternative livelihood option.
Next, the implications of the current livelihoods of islanders involved in the ornamental
coral fishery and the institutional contexts they operate in for future livelihood development
are discussed. The final section of the article provides recommendations for marine conser-
vation policies that aim at improving fisherfolk livelihoods and a sustainable management
of the fishery.
Materials and Methods
The Study Area
Indonesia is a vast archipelago of over 17,000 islands situated between the eastern Indian
Ocean and the western Pacific. The region is characterized by a variety of highly productive
coastal ecosystems, which support one of the largest marine fisheries in the world (Hopley
and Suharsono 2000). Over 80% of Indonesia’s estimated 240 million people live within
50 km of the coast. Artisanal fisheries play an important role in the country, making up more
than 95% of its total marine fisheries production (Burke, Selig, and Spalding 2002). Human
interactions with coral reefs in Indonesia date back to prehistoric times (Polunin 1983).
Some current reef fisheries, such as the collection of sea cucumbers, have been ongoing for
several centuries, and have since long ago linked Indonesian fishing communities to distant
markets (Butcher 2004; Schwerdtner Ma´n˜ez and Ferse 2010). However, the unsustainable
use of resources has risen dramatically over the past decades with increasing demands from
growing populations, international trade and changing consumption patterns (Miclat, Ingles,
and Dumaup 2006). Cyanide fishing for the live food and aquarium fish trades, blast fishing,
coral mining for construction materials and the aquarium trade, land-based pollution and
general overfishing have had considerable cumulative impacts on reefs over time (Barber
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and Pratt 1997; Burke, Selig, and Spalding 2002). Today, over 90% of Indonesia’s coral
reefs are under threat from such activities (Burke et al. 2011).
The study area, the Spermonde Archipelago off the coast of Makassar in South Su-
lawesi, extends about 60 km offshore and consists of more than 100 islands with fringing
reefs as well as a large number of barrier and submerged patch reefs (Tomascik et al. 1997).
An estimated 6,500 fishing households reside on the various islands and depend on the reefs
for their livelihoods. Scarce employment alternatives cause fishing efforts to remain high
throughout the year (Pet-Soede et al. 2001). Reef degradation is widespread (Edinger et al.
1998), with few recent improvements in management strategies despite the fact that scien-
tists have, for more than a decade, been warning that the reef ecosystem may be on the verge
of collapse (Erdmann 1995). As fish are becoming rarer, corals are selectively harvested
over large areas for the aquarium trade in Spermonde (Bruckner 2002). Massive corals have
been utilized by islanders as building materials for centuries. This practice has, however,
been declining in recent years due to increasing local awareness on the negative impacts
this has on coral reefs, and due to the availability of alternative construction materials on
the islands, such as cement and limestone rocks from the mainland. The collection of corals
for the ornamental trade focuses on smaller colonies and on particularly colorful morphs.
During initial visits to the area, two islands were found to be of primary importance in the
ornamental coral trade: Karanrang and Barrang Lompo. While Barrang Lompo is close to
the port of Makassar and has been an important hub of the Spermonde trade and fishery for
centuries, Karanrang is located more to the north, in the center of the archipelago (Figure 1).
Fishing is by far the dominant source of livelihood on the Spermonde islands. A detailed
survey in 2008 of every second household on Badi, an island halfway between Karanrang
and Barrang Lompo, found that 73% of the men were fishers, 52% of the women categorized
themselves as “housewives,” 18% of the respondents (male and female) were traders, and
4% (male and female) were entrepreneurs. A further 12% had other jobs (Ferse unpublished
data). These percentages correspond largely to an official breakdown of occupations for the
wider area (BPS 2009). Current official statistics record approximately 4,200 inhabitants
for Barrang Lompo (BPS 2010), while the island government estimates the number of
fishermen at around 2,000 (cited in Martens 2009). However, as only males are involved
in fishing, the latter number may be an overestimate. On Karanrang, where there are about
3,000 inhabitants, the number of fishermen is estimated at around 640 (BPS 2009).
Partly due to the proximity to Makassar airport, the Spermonde Archipelago has
become one of four major coral collection sites in Indonesia (Raymakers 2001). The country
supplies over 90% of the estimated 11–12 million pieces of stony coral traded globally per
year (Jones 2008; Wabnitz et al. 2003). Over 80% of the live corals from Indonesia are
exported to the United States and the European Union, and another 10% of Indonesian
corals are imported by Japan. Exports to China (mainly to Hong Kong) make up less
than 2% of the trade (Raymakers 2001). The harvest of key species for the international
ornamental trade, such as the mushroom coral Heliofungia actiniformis, is resulting in
severe overfishing at targeted reefs in Spermonde (Knittweis and Wolff 2010). Similarly,
Bruckner and Borneman (2006) estimated that over half of the stocks of several target
species were removed within just one year, underlining the need for effective management
of the fishery. There are only an estimated 100 fishers involved in the ornamental coral
fishery in Spermonde (Bruckner and Borneman 2006), so that the individual contribution
of each fisher is relatively large.
Interviews
Initial information on the ornamental coral fishery in Spermonde was gathered during a
two-year field study between 2005 and 2007 (Knittweis 2008). In March 2008, additional
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
13
.16
5.1
84
.12
1]
 at
 03
:54
 24
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Livelihoods of Ornamental Coral Fishermen 529
Figure 1. Map of the Spermonde Archipelago in South Sulawesi, showing the research locations
and current important coral collecting grounds based on interviews in the present study (shaded
areas). Since fishermen engaged in collection of ornamentals are opportunistic, other areas are also
infrequently subject to collection pressure. Note that key collection grounds differ over time and
according to species (see text).
key informant interviews with 12 persons directly involved in the ornamental coral trade
(trade company owners and middlemen) and 14 further local stakeholders (village elders,
nongovernmental organization [NGO] personnel and researchers at Hasanuddin University
(UNHAS) in Makassar) were conducted to collect background information on the ornamen-
tals trade in Spermonde. Questionnaire-based interviews combining semi-structured and
closed survey questions designed to generate detailed information on island-based actors
involved in the Spermonde ornamental coral trade (following Bunce et al. 2000) were then
conducted during a series of visits to Karanrang and Barrang Lompo in June and July 2008.
These interviews investigated:
• the respondents’ background and current role in the ornamental coral and other
fisheries
• respondents’ involvement and status in the local patron–client system
• the livelihood assets of respondents and their households
General housing conditions, household items necessary for the ornamental fishery (e.g.,
boats and compressors), and household items indicating material wealth (e.g., TV sets,
refrigerators, and motorcycles) were assessed. For each person interviewed, additional
data was collected on age, the year in which they began collecting ornamental corals,
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estimated average weekly income from the trade in ornamental corals in the previous year,
seasonality in the fishery, income sources besides ornamentals, number, age and education
of household members, as well as attitudes toward mariculture. As with all types of fishing
in Spermonde (except reef gleaning), the ornamental coral fishery is an exclusively male
activity. All of the interviewed coral collectors were therefore men. Respondents (n = 34
and n = 20 for Karanrang and Barrang Lompo, respectively) were randomly selected and
interviewed based on consent and availability, for instance by their presence at sorting
sites for ornamental coral species. According to a marine ornamental trader from Makassar
with good knowledge of the ornamental coral fishery, the majority of those involved in the
fishery on the two islands was interviewed in our study (M. Kasmi, personal communication,
December 2009).
Further observations and non-formal interviews were done during subsequent visits
to the area between February 2009 and March 2010. During these visits, semi-structured
interviews with various islanders, selected by purposive sampling, were conducted on a
number of islands in Spermonde to obtain more detailed information on trade and fishing
networks, patron–client relationships, and management options (see Glaser et al. 2010a
on the research approach used). In order to arrive at locally more meaningful conclusions,
some of the findings and implications of the questionnaire interviews were discussed with
local stakeholders. All interviews were conducted in Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia), either
by the authors themselves, or by staff of the Centre for Coral Reef Resources (PPTK, Pusat
Penelitian Terumbu Karang) at UNHAS.
For nominal data, differences in the frequency of items between different categories
of respondents were assessed using a mid-p version of the Freeman-Halton extended
Fisher exact test (Ruxton and Neuha¨user 2010). A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was
used for continuous data. For the Fisher-Freeman-Halton test, an online tool (available at
http://www.vassarstats.net) was used. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, the statistics package
SPSS 17 was used.
Results and Discussion
General Characteristics of the Ornamental Coral Fishery
While all respondents on Barrang Lompo were fishermen, five respondents on Karanrang
were punggawas (patrons). Three of the latter were patrons with a bigger business network
and capital at their disposal, while the remaining two were “small” local punggawas. These
patron categories are types of middlemen described in more detail in Table 1 and in the
section on informal institutions below. In 36% of the interviewed households on Barrang
Lompo (n = 14), several members of the same household were involved in the ornamental
coral fishery. On both islands, fishermen belonged to one of two groups of similar size
(Table 2): either those for whom the ornamental coral fishery was their primary income,
or those for whom it was a supplementary activity, with their main income derived from
fishing for other species. These groups represent opposite ends of a continuum, with the
relative importance of ornamental fishing for the household ranging from low to high. None
of the interviewed fishermen depended exclusively on ornamental coral species for their
livelihood, and most collected corals opportunistically (i.e., whenever they encountered
them during diving). Even among those who considered the ornamental coral fishery as
their primary source of income, only a minority (Barrang Lompo: n = 2, Karanrang: n =
6) focused specifically on collecting corals for the ornamental trade. The majority either
targeted sunu (red grouper) or had no particular target species. The primary income of those
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who collected corals as a supplementary income mostly came from the capture of grouper
and/or the collection of trepang (sea cucumbers) (Table 2). The ornamental fishery showed
distinct seasonality, with fishing activity and income from ornamentals being highest in the
dry season (April–October).
Several factors contributed to establishing these two islands as centers of the orna-
mental coral fishery in Spermonde. Not surprisingly, spatial proximity to the mainland
was important, since market demands could more easily be communicated and captured
organisms more quickly transported than from more distant locations. Both islands also
possessed infrastructure such as holding tanks necessary for catch sorting and storing, as
well as good local knowledge of fishing techniques. This may at least partly be due to the
fact that a large number of the fishermen on both islands were involved in the live sunu and
trepang fisheries. The trade in live grouper requires the use of holding tanks, and compres-
sor diving is frequently used for the capture of both species, which are consumed almost
exclusively in China. A 2007 report states that 90% of the fishermen on Karanrang used
compressors, and that cyanide use was widespread in the capture of red grouper for the live
food fish trade (COREMAP 2007). Knowledge of this technique facilitated the adoption of
coral collection as an additional activity: ornamental corals are usually collected by divers,
with air supplied through a hose attached to a compressor operated on a boat above (hookah
diving). Informants stated that they collected corals opportunistically while they were out
searching for grouper or trepang and indeed, a recent study of the Spermonde trepang fish-
ery shows that the main collection grounds for ornamental corals and trepang are almost
identical (Dumestre 2010). Both groupers and trepang have been severely overfished for
more than a decade (Johannes and Riepen 1995; Massin 1999), perhaps explaining why
coral collection was taken up as additional activity.
All interviewed fishermen stated that in addition to collecting corals they catch food
fish, either for their own consumption or for sale. Fishermen also targeted other organisms
if market opportunities arose, but while they may have had the required knowledge on
target species’ habitats, they depended on the punggawas for information on what species
were in demand on the market. An example of such opportunistic fishing is the bamboo
coral, Isis hippuris, which was targeted by a large number of dive-fishermen in Spermonde
between 2006 and 2008 when a new market emerged. The activity has since stopped due to
apparent overfishing (Ferse et al. in press). As one fisherman from Karanrang put it, “We
will take anything that looks like we might be able to sell it.” In contrast, the middlemen
of ornamental species were highly selective, buying only brightly colored specimens of
species for which there was an expressed demand, usually in the form of orders from
Makassar, Bali, or Jakarta. While the middlemen would sometimes inform fishermen on
the quantity of corals they intended to buy beforehand, fishermen nonetheless usually
collected a surplus of specimens, from which middlemen would then select those they
deemed most marketable. Depending on species, fishermen would receive from 2,000 to
15,000 IDR per coral (equivalent to about 0.2–1.7 USD), while the trading companies in
Makassar sold them for 10,000–50,000 IDR. The final retail price in European or U.S.
shops is between 35 and 80 USD. While in an average week, fishermen would earn around
200,000 IDR from ornamental corals, the average income of patrons was about 10 times as
high (see Table 3; both small punggawas reported an average income of 800,000 IDR, while
the average weekly income of big punggawas from ornamentals was between 2,000,000
and 4,000,000 IDR).
As explained in more detail in the section on the legal organization of the fishery below,
official harvest quotas form the legal basis for the ornamental coral fishery in Indonesia.
Bruckner and Borneman (2006) report that harvest of the coral species Catalaphyllia
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jardinei and Euphyllia cristata was allowed at unsustainable rates (the official annual quota
of each species exceeding 70% of the total population as estimated by the authors of the
study). Similarly, Yusuf (2005) observed that the quota for Blastomussa wellsi exceeded
the amount of naturally occurring colonies that could be sustainably harvested by 2:1, and
Knittweis and Wolff (2010) found that a harvest reduction of at least 60% was urgently
needed for Heliofungia actiniformis polyps sized 4–11 cm, the range most commonly
targeted in the ornamental fishery. Clearly, harvest rates were not decided according to
ecological criteria, and actual harvests appeared to be limited merely by the carrying
capacity of fishing boats and the demand from patrons. Moreover, all corals which the
fishermen were unable to sell were discarded. As a result, piles of discarded coral fragments
were found scattered along the beach and next to patrons’ houses on both islands.
Development of the Fishery over Time
All respondents stated to have begun the collection of ornamental corals from the mid-1990s
onward, with the highest annual number of people entering the ornamental coral fishery
in 2002 (Figure 2). An exception was one fisherman on Karanrang, who said that he had
begun ornamental fishing around 30 years ago (ca. 1980). It was, however, not clear whether
he was misjudging the time spent in the fishery. According to Syakir (2006), a Jakarta-
based company exporting ornamentals expanded its business to South Sulawesi toward the
end of the 1980s. In the early 1990s, representatives of trading companies in Makassar
began establishing themselves on Barrang Lompo and were expanding to other islands
by the mid-1990s. This is reflected in the patterns found in the present study. Learning
the techniques and obtaining training from traders (patrons or representatives of trading
Figure 2. Cumulative number of fishermen in the ornamental coral fishery (circles), and number
of fishermen entering the fishery each year, indicating their source of training in the fishery (bars).
“Traders” comprises patrons and representatives of Makassar-based trading companies, and “n/a”
refers to respondents who did not want to disclose or did not remember who initially trained them in
the fishery.
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companies), along with self-guided learning, drove the initial expansion of the ornamental
fishery. From the year 2000 on, friends, parents and other family members increasingly
became the main agents to pass on knowledge to those entering the ornamental fishery as
newcomers (Figure 2). By 2003, the fishery appeared to have reached a degree of saturation
in terms of number of fishermen that can partake under current conditions, since the number
of new entrants levels off from then on.
Collection Sites
Coral collection areas vary by target species (Bruckner and Borneman 2006), with the loca-
tion of habitats supporting the highly demanded bright color morphs differing in accordance
with the individual coral species’ ecology (Knittweis and Wolff 2010). Both study islands
had distinct primary coral collection grounds located to their northwest and west, respec-
tively (Figure 1). Interviewees stated that most collection sites were near the edge of the
shelf area, far from the trade centers in Barrang Lompo and Karanrang. Here, underwater
visibility is high, improving general working conditions. Moreover, nearshore areas were
reported to be more intensely monitored for license enforcement (e.g., by water police),
further deterring fishermen from these areas. By law, fishermen are required to carry copies
of collection licenses (which are issued to the trading companies; see following section)
with them when collecting.
Within these primary fishing grounds, fishermen differentiated and shifted among a
high number of different locations for collecting corals. In other areas of Sulawesi, such
frequent shifting between fishing grounds has been described as a conscious strategy for
spreading fishing effort and conserving resources (Lowe 2006). It could, however, also
be interpreted as a form of marine roving banditry, where fishermen move on to the
next fishing ground once previously visited ones are exhausted (Berkes et al. 2006). The
latter interpretation was at least partially correct for the Spermonde ornamental fishery. As
successive reefs were overharvested, distances between the collector’s home islands and
harvesting areas have been steadily rising, causing an increase in transport times and costs.
At present, fishermen from Karanrang are forced to embark on 3–4-day fishing trips when
specifically targeting corals.
Legal Organization of the Fishery
The trade of all species of stony corals is regulated by the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which stipulates that ratifying countries can
only trade species if their export will not be detrimental to the species’ survival. In or-
der to ensure a sustainable harvest of corals and thus to implement CITES, Indonesia has
adopted a number of principles. These include provisions that corals are only harvested
from assessed sites, that targeted coral colonies or surrounding biota are not destroyed
during collection, that harvest is done by trained fishermen only, and that coral fishermen
undertake coral transplantation (Samedi and Liman 2002; Suharsano and Bruckner 2008).
However, in contrast to these official principles, there was no indication of any regular
official assessment of all coral harvest sites in Spermonde, nor did fishermen take special
care during collection, or were even trained or encouraged to do so. Moreover, no coral
transplantation by fishermen was observed or reported.
Forestry Ministry Decree (KepMenhut) No. 104/Kpts-II/2003 (Forestry Ministry
2003a) assigns the Natural Resources Conservation Board (Badan Konservasi Sumber
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Daya Alam, BKSDA) under the General Director for Environmental Conservation and
Forest Protection (Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam, PHKA) as the Management
Authority for CITES in Indonesia. The scientific authority for determining collection quotas
is assigned to the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia,
LIPI), as specified in LIPI directorial decree (SK Kepala LIPI) No. 1973/2002 (LIPI 2002;
see also Knittweis 2008; Yusuf 2005). LIPI research for the determination of catch quotas
is financed by AKKII (Asosiasi Koral, Kerang dan Ikan hias Indonesia, the Indonesian
Coral, Shell and Ornamental Fish Association), the business organization of Indonesian
ornamental traders (I. Radjawali, personal communication, December 2011). However, two
recent studies of ornamental coral collection in Spermonde concluded that harvest quotas
neither took into account ecological criteria nor did they consider the realities of local har-
vesting practices (Bruckner and Borneman 2006; Knittweis and Wolff 2010). The licenses
for coral collection are issued to trading companies, and state the names of middlemen and
fishermen working for the company, as well as the types and amounts of corals permitted
for collection. Patrons and fishers usually hold copies of the collection licenses from the
companies they are selling to. However, while the amount of coral delivered to the trade
companies usually agrees with that specified on the permit, the amount actually collected by
fishermen is much higher, as explained above. Theoretically, as licenses are issued to trad-
ing companies, fishermen depend on middlemen with connections to officially recognized
companies to be listed on licenses. However, although all ornamental fishermen should be
listed on official trade licenses, almost none of the interviewees were on the official list of
licensed fishermen provided by the responsible authority. Thus, although supposedly only
registered fishermen were entitled to collect corals, and all collectors should carry copies
of the licenses they were listed on, this official regulation de-facto was not functioning.
A major constraint to effective enforcement appeared to arise from conflicting and
overlapping institutional responsibilities: while quota-setting and the issuing of licenses
are handled by BKSDA, fishing grounds are patrolled by the provincial Department of
Fisheries and Marine Affairs (Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan, DKP), and the navy and wa-
ter police in Makassar. Enforcement of fishery regulations is the responsibility of the water
police, but many informants remarked that little enforcement takes place due to corruption.
For instance, several informants mentioned that punggawas have achieved the release of
fishermen convicted of using illegal methods by using their good relations with the police
and navy (see also Idrus 2009). This has led to frustration among islanders who use legal
methods and report offenders. In addition, patrolling of the collection grounds was rare due
to lack of personnel, boats, and fuel. Furthermore, although some training on environmen-
tally friendly ornamental fish collection was provided by the Marine Aquarium Council
(MAC) in 2008, no international certification scheme for ornamentals from Spermonde,
which under a functioning management and enforcement regime might act as an incentive
for fishermen employing legal and sustainable harvest methods, is in place yet.
In sum, the implementation of laws and government regulations related to ornamental
coral collection appeared largely dysfunctional.
Informal Institutions and Networks
In the face of dysfunctional official institutions, the fishery was governed by local, non-
formal institutions. At the same time, it was strongly driven by demands from overseas
markets. Fishing grounds surrounding the uninhabited islands in the archipelago were
accessible to all fishermen, but fishing in the waters surrounding some of the inhabited
islands required permission from local villagers (see Glaser et al. 2010b for a discussion
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of the conservation potentials of this emergent local institution). Access was usually only
restricted for fishermen that used destructive fishing techniques (i.e., bomb and cyanide
fishing). The specifics of restrictions differed between islands—sometimes, only cyanide
would be banned, while in other cases, part of the catch would need to be shared with the
local community (for further details on local rules, see Glaser et al. 2010b). While rules
concerning marine resource use were evolving locally for waters surrounding inhabited
islands, the behavior of fishermen targeting waters of uninhabited islands further from
the mainland was mostly influenced by their dependence on particular patrons, who pro-
vided gear, demanded delivery of specific species of coral, and informed fishermen on the
best harvesting grounds (see also the section on the regulatory role of the patron–client
relationship).
Similar to other fisheries in the archipelago, the ornamental coral fishery is organized
in the punggawa/sawi system, a hierarchical patron–client structure. Patron–client rela-
tionships are widespread within rural production systems such as small-scale fisheries,
particularly in developing countries, and they have a long and well-documented history
in Southeast Asia (see, e.g., Firth 1966; Merlijn 1989; Platteau and Nugent 1992; Ruddle
2011). In Spermonde, the punggawa/sawi system is common in generally the same structure
in virtually all fishing activities, and it has existed in the region for centuries (Meereboer
1998; Pelras 2000; Schwerdtner Ma´n˜ez and Ferse 2010). Mattudala (1995) distinguishes
between big and small punggawas. Small punggawas usually focus on a single fishery
and deal directly with the fishermen working for them, while punggawas that diversify
their activities usually employ assistants (who often act as “small” punggawas) to aid in
particular parts of the business, such as a single fishery. These kinds of patrons are referred
to as big punggawas (see also Yusran 2002). As small punggawas usually acquire their
own materials and possess their own starting capital, they are generally not in debt to the
big patrons. Table 1 shows an overview of the different types of actors involved in the
ornamental fishery on the islands, together with some of their characteristics. There are
between 10–20 punggawas, and up to 15 fishermen can be linked to an individual “small”
punggawa. While the bond between a traditional small punggawa and his clients usually
involves both debt and social ties such as mutual trust, kinship and a feeling of obligation,
in more recent activities such as the live reef fish trade, the relationship to big patrons is
often of an exclusively financial nature, and these fisheries tend to be one among several
business activities of big patrons. A strong emphasis on credits, debts, and market access
is common, and patrons in such a relationship are often referred to as boss or “bos,” the
latter being an English language derivate used by the islanders (Meereboer 1998). Further-
more, some middlemen simply act as “transporters,” providing the physical link between
local punggawas and the market. They are locally known as pa’balolang and buy the
catch from several punggawas and transport it to Makassar, where they are linked, either
directly or through further intermediaries, to exporting companies. There is a tendency for
the big, multi-business patrons not to provide the social services that small punggawas
rely on to secure their relationships with fishermen–clients. Besides their links to small
punggawas, big punggawas may also deal directly with fishermen, but these relationships
are business-like in nature, with the patrons providing materials or credit only without of-
fering any support in emergency situations (Krause et al. unpublished manuscript). While
traditionally, punggawas would mostly focus exclusively on one type of fishery, one of the
interviewed big patrons also traded trepang, and one of the small punggawas primarily
traded fish and trepang. Fishermen were usually indebted to only one punggawa, to whom
they sold their catch in order to repay their debt. They were then free to sell surplus catches,
or organisms “their” patrons were not interested in (e.g., trepang and grouper), to other
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patrons. In contrast to artisanal food fisheries, where approximately 25% of the fishermen
are independent from a punggawa (Ferse unpublished data), the number of independent
fishermen in the ornamental coral fishery was smaller, at least partly due to the need for
specific gear, licenses, and licenses. While selling to a patron without a debt bond would
often result in better prices to the fishermen, this usually entailed a tradeoff, since such
transactions precluded potential social obligations on the part of the buyers.
Table 3 gives an overview of the different livelihood assets available to fishermen and
patrons. Only a minority of fishermen owned the fishing gear they use; for the majority, the
relationship to a patron secured access to fishing gear. While conversations with other types
of fishermen and on other islands indicated some reluctance toward compressor diving due
to awareness of the associated health risks, a large number of fishermen appeared willing
to venture into this activity if given the means to do so. The number and distribution of
fishermen making use of compressor diving thus appeared to be driven predominantly
by the presence of punggawas specializing in the marine products gathered by this kind
of fishery. 95% of the interviewed fishermen on Barrang Lompo, and 93% of those on
Karanrang, received compressors, boats, masks, and fins from patrons. Similarly, both of
the interviewed small punggawas stated they had received their gear from their bosses,
underlining they themselves were attached to patrons above them. Only one fisherman
on Barrang Lompo used his own gear. On the other hand, all three large patrons owned
equipment, which they lent to their client fishermen.
Management of finances is the traditional domain of island women. For instance,
punggawas’ wives were responsible for the accounting and overseeing their husbands’ ex-
penses. Women in fishing households frequently sold fruits, vegetables, and miscellaneous
household items brought from Makassar, as well as homemade drinks and snacks. They
thus supplemented household income, providing additional resources in times of hardship.
A curious two-way trade in food fish was common: fish catches from the islands were
usually sold entirely to Makassar city by traders and their families, while the fish consumed
locally was usually cheap farmed fish shipped out to the islands from Makassar.
Social networks were quite extensive for both islands: all respondents had relatives
living on their and on other islands, and the majority had relatives on the mainland and in
Makassar. Among the peoples of South Sulawesi, kinship ties are of vital importance for so-
cial organization e.g. in enterprise and migration (Acciaioli 2000). Interviewed punggawas
in different fisheries from a number of islands in the area frequently mentioned relatives
in Makassar as an important prerequisite for entering trade. Individual small punggawas
usually focused on one type of catch. Family ties among and between punggawas and
fishermen thus helped to establish channels for the purchase and sale of a wider range of
organisms. Family ties to other islands aided punggawas in broadening their networks of
credit and debt by involving new fishermen that would deliver their catch to them. Extended
networks helped to ensure a steady supply of catches to patrons when individual fishermen
were unsuccessful during a fishing trip. This improves the patrons’ ability to meet orders
from companies in Makassar. The more fishermen contribute catches to a patron, the better
they are able to compensate in case individual fishermen were unsuccessful. Big patrons
that can draw on several punggawas to supply catch are thus in a better position than a
traditional small punggawa with ties to only a few fishermen. In recent years, competition
among punggawas for fishermen to provide labor and catch has been increasing. Similarly,
fishermen regarded the relatives of their wives as a social and economic asset, to be called
on, for instance, to provide fishing labor or access to punggawas on other islands.
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Distribution of Knowledge
Similar to small-scale fisheries elsewhere (Crona and Bodin 2010), patrons were not only
important sources of fishing gear and credit, but also key knowledge brokers in the fishery.
Only a small number of respondents on Karanrang received training from NGOs such as
the Marine Aquarium Council (MAC) or the World Bank–funded Coral Reef Rehabilitation
and Management Project (COREMAP). In general, patrons were in a better position than
fishermen to gain access to these opportunities due to their status and social connections
(Table 3). This reflects the observation of Glaser et al. (2010b) that training projects
offered in the area frequently reached only a restricted number of people close to the
local contact person. As a result, two big patrons on Karanrang but no fishermen were
part of a local fishermen’s cooperative. Such cooperatives are important for exchanging
information on markets and prices. Ornamental trading companies in Makassar, although
in strong competition with each other, have initiated such a network, the Sulawesi Coral
and Ornamental Fish Association (AKIS). Fishermen affiliated with a particular punggawa
tended to stick to their own group, and there were several instances of rivalry between groups
associated with different punggawas. This may explain why local fishing cooperatives
were rare. Such social divisions along patron–client lines pose a considerable challenge to
management efforts that rely on the spread of information between members of assumedly
homogeneous communities (Ferse et al. 2010).
During informal talks with fishermen in Spermonde throughout the study, statements
indicating decreasing resources were frequently voiced. According to such statements
by fishermen, CPUE declined by an estimated 90% for some ornamental fish species in
the past ten years (I. Radjawali, personal communication, October 2009). Paradoxically,
this decrease did not automatically mean that resources were viewed as finite. Patrons
actively spread the opinion that natural resources are inexhaustible, and their attitude was
reiterated by the fishermen. The respondents attributed the observed scarcity of targeted
fish and sea cucumber species to natural variability, or assumed that the organisms had
“moved elsewhere.” Frequently, religious convictions were invoked to justify the belief in
inexhaustible resources, despite widespread evidence to the contrary (see Martens 2009
for an account of fish-related local ecological knowledge among Spermonde fishermen).
Furthermore, perceptions of resource decline differed significantly between respondents
(Fisher-Freeman-Halton test, p = .027). Twelve of the fishermen on Barrang Lompo, and 14
on Karanrang, stated that the size or amount of targeted corals had decreased, although some
also stated that no change had occurred (2 on Barrang Lompo and 9 on Karanrang). While
both small punggawas said that the amount of target corals had decreased, none of the big
patrons reported any changes, indicating that ecological information, such as on changes in
catch, was not communicated from fishermen to traders. Since big patrons obtained corals
from a large number of fishermen, decreased amounts of corals collected by individual
fishermen might have gone unnoticed by the traders. As big patrons and small punggawas
have usually made considerable investments into the fishery, they are likely to resist changes
in resource use and to be unwilling to concede signs of overharvesting (see Crona and
Bodin 2010). Moreover, as one respondent stated, “there is a punggawa for everything”
fishermen are able to collect from the reef. Although the patrons discriminated against coral
specimens of undesired color or shape (see above), the fishermen’s perception that there is a
demand for all marine products is likely to have reduced their concern over decreasing reef
resources.
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Regulatory Role of the Patron–Client Relationship
While the debt-relationships between patrons and clients are sometimes criticized as ex-
ploitative and only of benefit to the patrons, in particular by government personnel or actors
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the relationship (see, e.g., Idrus 2009, 127), patrons often
also provide social security to clients, thereby reducing the socioeconomic vulnerability
of fishermen in times of bad weather and other hardships (Platteau and Nugent 1992).
Indeed, analyses across the globe show that a transition from the traditional multi-stranded
bonds between patrons and clients towards single-stranded, exclusively economic relations
between producers and purely business-focused traders is likely to increase the vulnera-
bility of fishing households in the absence of alternative forms of social security (Glaser
et al. 2010c; Ruthven and Kumar 2002; Wood 2003). While some fishermen mentioned
that they would be glad to be free from the debt owed to their patron so as to sell their
catch at higher prices, they were also mindful of the benefits offered by the attachment
to a traditional punggawa. Idrus (2009) offers a multifaceted view of the punggawa–sawi
system in Spermonde and the social and economic functions it assumes. Many informants
confirmed that fishermen who are not in debt to a patron are free to choose whom to sell
their catch to. Measures to avoid debt would thus foster competition among punggawas
and are likely to increase the profit margin for fishers. Furthermore, several interviewed
punggawas mentioned difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of fishers to work for them,
underlining the two-way nature of the relationship. As a result, punggawas “compete” by
offering good conditions (e.g., in terms of loans or social services) to their sawis, and
perceptions of being treated “well” are an important factor for fishers to remain with a
particular punggawa. However, decisions regarding changes in livelihood strategies often
are not straightforward, but influenced by complex social, cultural, and institutional factors
(Daw et al. 2012). Understanding under which conditions fishermen prefer credit schemes
over ties to a punggawa, or would be willing to undergo more wide-ranging changes in
livelihood strategies, requires further study.
Currently, borrowing from punggawas is a key coping strategy in times of hardship
for Spermonde islanders. If their husbands were away on long fishing trips or could not
go to sea as a result of bad weather, wives of fishermen obtained goods from small stores
on the islands on credit, reducing their households’ vulnerability to fluctuations in fishing-
dependent income. Such credit was provided by the husbands’ punggawas, who added it
to the debt of “their” fishermen. The punggawas also played a central role in trade: either
directly or through middlemen, they were linked to traders in Makassar, and thus to markets
for marine products that are exported but not consumed locally, such as ornamentals or sea
cucumbers. Punggawas also ensured protection from law enforcement by their connections
to the exporting companies, allowing the names of the fishermen working for them to
be registered on the licenses for the collection of corals or other CITES-covered species.
Furthermore, patrons (at least those with a focus on only one kind of marine product)
usually provided fishermen with information on where particular species of coral could be
found.
Patrons are thus a part of both the problem and the possible solution (see also Merlijn
1989 and Crona et al. 2010) in ornamental fisheries management: they channel demand and
open market access by making connections to the exporting companies, thereby enabling
the harvest of ornamental corals in the first place. As a comparably small group, they wield
considerable influence over the ornamental fishery through financial and social ties, and
can therefore play a key role in the management of the fishery. For example, by providing
the expensive gear, licenses, and trade connections for the coral fishery, they essentially
control access to the fishery. In the absence of this control over market and fishery access,
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the likelihood of a commons dilemma increases, as fishermen might compete to gather all
available resources to sell them to buyers in Makassar. Punggawas can also influence which
species and how many specimens are harvested, and they can demand that environmentally
friendly methods are used during harvesting. As discussed above, the needed change in
their attitudes is not likely without a fundamental re-organization of the fishery. The high
amount of corals brought to the traders by fishermen that ends up discarded shows that
the positive influence that patrons could potentially have on harvesting activities is not
being harnessed at present. Nevertheless, the punggawa–sawi relationship emerges from
this analysis as possessing substantial transformation potential for the ornamental coral
fishery (sensu DFID 1999): it effectively determines the course of the fishery and the
livelihood options available to the involved fishermen. For the development of formal
fisheries management frameworks based on local marine tenure systems, Dahl (1988)
identifies resource scarcity, resource boundaries, user group identification, limitations on
technology, and economic organization as key factors. While the first two aspects are
manifest in the natural environment of the reef fishery in Spermonde, the punggawa–sawi
system is currently the major, if not only, framework within which to address the latter
three aspects.
Attitudes toward Mariculture Introduction
In order for mariculture to constitute a realistic livelihood option and alternative to wild
harvest of marine resources, existing constraints to its development need to be addressed.
Assessing local attitudes and perceptions is an important first step. On Barrang Lompo,
16 of the interviewed fishermen (80%) knew someone involved in coral farming. On the
other hand, only one big patron and two of the interviewed fishermen on Karanrang knew
mariculturists, and only one of these acquaintances was involved in coral farming. A single
fisherman on Barrang Lompo, and two on Karanrang, stated they would start mariculture
activity themselves. Two of these were the same people that knew other mariculturists,
confirming that previous acquaintance with mariculture is an important precondition for
a positive attitude toward mariculture (Miyata and Manatunge 2004). Coral and fish were
the organisms these fishermen would choose to culture. Patrons were not interested in
venturing into mariculture, as they perceived this as a riskier enterprise compared to relying
on fishermen to provide them with ornamental corals. The main reasons for not wanting to
begin mariculture are listed in Table 4.
Table 4
Reasons mentioned by interviewees for not wanting to attempt mariculture (multiple an-
swers were possible)
Barrang Lompo Karanrang
Constraint
Fishermen
(n = 18)
Fishermen
(n = 14)
Patrons
(n = 4)
Lack of know-how 8 44% 5 36% 2 50%
Lack of finances 12 67% 1 7% 0 0%
Too difficult 2 11% 2 14% 0 0%
Too risky 0 0% 0 0% 2 50%
Other/no particular reason 4 22% 7 50% 1 25%
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When asked what they would need in order to start mariculture, only fishermen re-
sponded. Four respondents mentioned financial capital, one knowledge, and one materials.
Based on these findings, it appears that on Barrang Lompo, where most respondents were
familiar with coral mariculture, lack of finances and technical knowledge were the major
constraints to mariculture development. On Karanrang, where only three of the respondents
knew someone involved in mariculture, a general uncertainty regarding mariculture and the
lack of specific knowledge appeared to be the major limiting factors.
An investment by patrons into activities not related to fishing is likely to increase their
readiness to agree to management interventions changing prevailing fishing patterns, as
they would be less dependent on the status quo for their income (Crona and Bodin 2010).
The reluctance of patrons to venture into mariculture underlines that financial means are not
the only limiting factor. Efforts to promote mariculture need to investigate the biology of
candidate species and to demonstrate the feasibility of mariculture. Moreover, mariculture
can have considerable environmental impacts (e.g., Naylor et al. 2000; Ro¨nnba¨ck, Bryceson,
and Kautsky 2002), although the impacts of ornamental mariculture are considered to
be more benign than those of culturing organisms for consumption (Tlusty 2002). Both
economic viability and environmental impacts need to be assessed in more detail before
ornamental mariculture should be considered a realistic option in Spermonde. As long as
integrated coastal management and monitoring of environmental impacts are insufficient,
the large-scale promotion of mariculture needs to be treated with caution.
Implications for Livelihood Development
In contrast to many coastal and island locations elsewhere (e.g., Bruge`re, Holvoet, and
Allison 2008 and references therein; Cinner, Marnane, and McClanahan 2005; Turner et al.
2007), there are few livelihood alternatives in Spermonde that do not depend on coral reef
resources. A diversification into other activities is limited mainly by a lack of education,
the absence of opportunities on the mainland, a lack of resources on the islands themselves,
and, not least, by the reliance of most island households on patrons that specialize in marine
products. The relatively small number of people engaged in the fishery and the low number
of new entrants suggest that well-targeted socioeconomic management interventions, such
as supplemental livelihood programs (Gillet et al. 2008), may be particularly effective
in reducing the ecological impact of this fishery to a sustainable level (Kronen et al.
2010). Yet, important caveats remain. Without an adequate framework (e.g., in the form
of regulation of access to the fishery), livelihood alternatives may be ineffective, or even
lead to an intensification of fishing effort (Sievanen et al. 2005). Furthermore, if and how
fishing households are able to tap into livelihood alternatives also depends on the wider
socioeconomic context (Kronen et al. 2010).
The COREMAP project has developed a credit scheme under which all villages in
the project area within the Spermonde Archipelago can access so-called village grants
for infrastructure development, conservation measures, and capacity building (DKP 2006).
However, due at least in part to the recent introduction of this program, credits have not
been available to the majority of islanders (Glaser et al. 2010b).
A major constraint on the livelihood options of ornamental fishermen was the scarcity
of available land and freshwater. While there is a limited amount of arable land available
on Karanrang, a scarcity of freshwater makes farming activities almost impossible. On this
island, most respondents received their water from one of the public wells, and several
wells on the island were becoming increasingly salty at the time of the survey. On Barrang
Lompo, the freshwater situation was better, and several fishermen had their own water
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
13
.16
5.1
84
.12
1]
 at
 03
:54
 24
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Livelihoods of Ornamental Coral Fishermen 545
sources. However, the island is very densely populated, and almost no land remains without
construction on it. While Barrang Lompo had been able to supply fresh water to surrounding
islands in the past, the wells on the island were just sufficient to meet the inhabitants’ own
needs at the time the present study was carried out. On both islands, access to the few
available plots of land required permission from the village leadership.
Additional income generating activities mentioned as desirable by several respondents
included ecotourism and small-scale business development. Yet, there is a discouraging
local history of small-scale trainings (for instance, fishball-making and the manufacture
of key chains with wood-carved seahorses), which failed because they found no markets.
This underlines the fact that business managers need to be involved in alternative income
trainings. Tourism development in the area is hampered by a lack of infrastructure (transport,
accommodation, electricity, food and water availability) and, most importantly, by severe
problems with ecosystem degradation and pollution coupled with a lack of awareness
regarding these issues. Islanders also frequently mentioned that a supply of electricity
beyond the current 5 hours per day would enable them to better pursue strategies such as
small-scale selling of household items or the opening of food stalls. While households of
middlemen and traders may have been able to supplement their electricity by using private
generators, this option was too costly for fishing households. The majority of male youths
opted to use their time to go fishing rather than pursuing a school education in quest of
instant returns, both out of necessity and out of a desire for fast material gains. This further
limited their access to non-fishing occupations.
The fishermen’s belief that there are markets available for practically any marine
resource, combined with the promotion of questionable ecological views by punggawas,
reduced local concerns over decreasing resources. Moreover, while an awareness of the
connection between unsustainable harvest and resource degradation and a perception of
crisis can contribute to management success (Pollnac, Crawford, and Gorospe 2001), a
change in fishing behavior can be prevented by other factors. Lack of time, knowledge,
positive examples, funding, and material support led to a high reluctance among fishermen
to develop supplementary livelihoods such as mariculture. In times of low fishing activity,
fishing households had to rely on punggawas to meet their needs, thus increasing their
dependence and vulnerability.
The Role of Patrons in Livelihood Development and Management Strategies
Punggawas might play a prominent role in an integrated and holistic management ap-
proach. They are the link between fishermen, markets, and fishing technology, yet are often
overlooked in fisheries management (Yusran 2002; Krause et al. unpublished manuscript).
They potentially hinder livelihood diversification beyond fisheries for at least two reasons:
by opening up markets for a wide range of marine resources, and, as opinion leaders, by
preventing the development of perceptions of resource crisis among fishermen (Crona et al.
2010). Furthermore, due to their sometimes high investments into fishing gear, they are
likely to resist changes in marine resource use (Crona and Bodin 2010). These factors need
to be considered when designing management approaches. As long as the development of
social safety nets and credit schemes for poorer fisherfolk is not adequate, management
needs to acknowledge the critical role of punggawas based on their links to fishermen
and product markets. Their careful inclusion in conservation planning also increases the
chances for reaching a large number of fishermen with a relatively small effort. In the face
of unreliable law enforcement and fishery monitoring, marshalling the support of pung-
gawas in the interest of the sustainability of their trade may enable better management of
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the fishery. This should entail targeted efforts to change their attitudes and behavior, so as
to influence “their” fishermen. At the same time, holistic management needs to strengthen
the capacities and position of fishermen vis-a`-vis patrons in order to establish checks and
also to avoid re-enforcing preexisting inequalities. Important steps in this direction may
be the provision of low-interest credits to fishermen outside the sphere of influence of the
punggawas to cope with seasonality in fishing, and efforts to enable fishers not linked to
punggawas to be listed on the collection licenses of trading companies. Attachment to par-
ticular patrons seems a major factor preventing the fishermen from organizing themselves
(e.g., in the form of fishing cooperatives). This particular point requires further attention, as
self-organization may help to increase the bargaining power of fishers toward patrons and
enable them to demand a higher share of the profits derived from ornamentals. However,
in the absence of adequate fisheries management, this could lead to a further unchecked
increase in fishing effort, and support in self-organization should thus form part of a wider
management strategy. Toward this end, self-organization could allow fishers to become in-
volved in formal monitoring and quota setting efforts, and enable them to become eligible
for fishing licenses without depending on patrons and trading companies. Common objec-
tives should be jointly developed by fishermen, punggawas and managers. The reasons why
previous NGO trainings predominantly reached punggawas rather than fishermen need to
be examined and programs with improved access for fishermen designed.
Recommendations for Multi-Level Management
The current state of the fishery does not bode well for the conservation of the coral reefs of
Spermonde. Despite being one of the most important ornamental coral fisheries in Indonesia,
the activity in Spermonde is not very specialized. As long as the perception of open resource
access and unlimited market potential for a wide range of marine commodities prevails,
the collectors’ level of concern with the sustainability of this fishery is likely to be limited.
Currently, the number of active fishers seems to have reached a saturation level. However, as
global demand for marine ornamentals continues to rise and most fishermen in Spermonde
act opportunistically, switching to new target species if market access arises, it is likely that
more fishermen will add ornamentals to their portfolio of targeted organisms if given the
chance. The present regulation of the ornamental fishery appears to be ineffective. Current
collection grounds are far from the mainland and from inhabited islands, so that both
government policing and regulations by island communities are likely to be insufficient
for the management of the fishery. Thus, both local fishermen and punggawas will have to
play a more active role in management. One example on how to achieve this comes from
Tanzania, where local residents serve as the lowest tier in a nested fisheries management
program, providing data and ecological feedback to higher levels of management and
science (de la Torre-Castro 2006). Another exists in the Marine Extractive Reserves in
Brazil which effectively mobilize local monitoring and sanctioning efforts (Diegues 2008;
Glaser et al. 2010c). If the active participation of such local stakeholders is neglected,
outcomes may instead be counterproductive (Ferse et al. 2010). For example, the Indonesian
ministerial decree that regulates the capture of wild animals stipulates that collection within
national parks, nature reserves, game reserves, recreation areas and nature conservation
areas is not allowed (Forestry Ministry 2003b). Currently, a high number of local no-
take areas are being established throughout Spermonde in the frame of the COREMAP
project, and there are plans to integrate the whole area into one large marine protected
area (MPA) with several zones (Glaser et al. 2010b). Unless the regulations are modified
to permit sustainable harvesting within designated zones of the MPA, conflicts with coral
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collectors are likely to arise, threatening conservation goals. A reduction in the number
of permissible collection sites without a parallel decrease in catch quotas will lead to the
concentration of harvesting activity on a few areas, so that even previously benign levels of
harvest may locally increase beyond sustainable levels (Harriott 2003). Similarly, current
strategies of the Indonesian government to increase fisheries production and improve the
wellbeing of coastal fishing communities include plans to provide fishing gear, access to
loans and markets, and to deregulate fishing enterprises (see Article 4 in MoMAF 2010).
The present analysis indicates that this strategy might in fact increase overfishing and
resource degradation, thus endangering fishing-dependent livelihoods.
Improved management efforts are needed to prevent further degradation and to set
the stage for an effective conservation of the region’s coral reefs. Government Regulation
7/1999 (Government of Indonesia 1999) on the Preservation of Flora and Fauna, which
forms the basis for the population management of ornamental corals, explicitly provides
the legal basis for local communities to become involved in population monitoring (e.g.,
by integrating them in fisheries monitoring). Furthermore, a number of recent regulations
on marine management include provisions for local communities to participate in the
development and implementation of management plans for coastal and small island waters
(Siry 2011). Such integrative co-management has the potential to steer the fishery toward
a more sustainable path (see also Samedi and Liman 2002). Three key “actor nodes” of
the fishery require specific management interventions: (1) individual fishermen, (2) small
and big punggawas, and (3) government institutions (including regulation of exporters in
Makassar). All measures should be part of an integrated, holistic approach.
At the level of individual fishermen, recommended measures are:
• Improve the local understanding of ecological processes underlying the fishery,
including the concept of sustainable harvesting. While fisherfolk have some lo-
cal knowledge on species habitats, abundances, and changes in these, the fact that
resources are finite and are rapidly being depleted by human activities is seldom
appreciated. Similar convictions are common elsewhere in Indonesia (e.g., Majors
2008). Environmental education could build upon the existing perception of decreas-
ing catches and sizes, but needs to challenge the currently prevailing assumption that
marine resources are inexhaustible. Crona and Bodin (2010) recommend working
with influential opinion leaders that do not have high capital investments in the
fishery. In Indonesia, this could be attempted for example by working with religious
leaders in the fishing communities. At the same time, fishermen should be included
in the generation and analysis of ecological data used to set quotas and monitor the
resources as much as possible, as stipulated in Government Regulation No. 7/1999.
Doing so would both support an improved understanding of ecological processes
and involve fishermen in the management process, thus increasing the potential to
render it more responsive to local rationalities and perceptions.
• Improve access to market information for the ornamental coral trade and enable
fishermen to become registered on fishing licenses independent of patrons. Im-
proved transparency along the ornamental trade chain from foreign consumer to the
Spermonde fishermen with regard to species and amounts in demand would help
to increase fisheries selectivity and constitute a step toward the establishment of
a certification scheme. It may also improve the bargaining position of fishermen
towards their punggawas, though this effect will be reduced by debt ties between
fishermen and punggawas and through lack of competition for clients among indi-
vidual punggawas. The direct listing of fishermen or fishing cooperatives on fishing
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licenses, which would reduce their dependence on patrons, could be brokered by the
regional Fishery Department, as part of a process to include fisherfolk in fisheries
monitoring.
• Carefully design and implement credit schemes to decrease fisherfolks’ need to
borrow from punggawas. As confirmed by interviewed fishermen, indebtedness is
one of the major factors curtailing their choice to turn to alternative, non-fishing
income-generating activities. Debt often forces fishermen to adopt unsustainable
fishing methods. Financing schemes are part of many coastal development and
management programs such as for instance the COREMAP program, which is active
in parts of Spermonde (DKP 2006). However, the implementation of this program
needs to be improved to ensure that credit schemes are accessible to larger sections
of the island communities (Glaser et al. 2010b).
• Make use of legal provisions that allow local communities to participate in the
development of coastal zone and marine resource use management plans. In return
for their collaboration in resource monitoring and fisheries data collection, fishermen
could be encouraged to form local organizations endowed with territorial use rights
and with opportunities for collaborating in quota setting and for obtaining fishing
licenses. Including fishers in monitoring, zoning and quota setting, and assigning
to them exclusive use rights to identified territories and direct access to fishing
licenses, would increase the chance that this important group develops self-interest
in the sustainability of the fishery.
• Create conditions that allow for the development of livelihood alternatives outside
fisheries and thus reduce extractive pressure on the reefs. The preliminary assessment
of attitudes toward mariculture showed that currently, the large majority of fishermen
and middlemen are for various reasons not keen to engage in mariculture. Changing
this attitude would require a comprehensive approach, beginning with market anal-
ysis and site selection, the establishment of pilot projects and environmental impact
studies, comprehensive training and credit schemes as well as long-term financial
and technical assistance. Pilot projects should target fishermen as well as punggawas
since the latter have made high investments in the fishery, channel demand, and pro-
vide market access, thus ultimately driving fishing activities. If mariculture is to
be pursued as a locally feasible alternative livelihood strategy, additional research
is needed to arrive at an in-depth understanding of local motivations and attitudes
relating to fisheries and potential alternatives.
In relation to the small and big punggawas, the following recommendations can be made:
• Improve communication with fishermen about which species are sought for the
market in order to decrease the amount of discarded corals. This measure would
allow fishermen to use their time more efficiently, and to receive higher returns for
their efforts, as less time would be spent on collecting corals they are unable to sell.
It would also reduce the amount of discarded corals, which would be desirable for
punggawas if discarded corals were included in their total allowable catch quota
(see recommendations for government institutions).
• Enlist the help of punggawas in the promotion of ecological awareness among
fishermen to change the currently prevalent belief in god-given inexhaustible marine
resources. While coral reef management programs frequently include efforts to raise
the environmental awareness of fishermen, ecological training should be offered to
punggawas as well. As influential opinion leaders they are in a central position to
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influence collection activities, yet are not always well informed about ecological
change since, as traders, they have little direct contact with the reef ecosystem.
• Institutionalize feedback on ecological conditions at the collection grounds by es-
tablishing mandatory reporting on collected species to government authorities (see
de la Torre-Castro 2006). Punggawas usually have invested sufficiently into the
ornamental trade (e.g., by establishing links to traders in Makassar, or by building
holding facilities) to be interested in the sustainability of the fishery. This could
be used as a starting point to establish collaborations between them and regulatory
authorities, for example by stipulating that patrons and fishers listed on licenses
submit regular reports on the amount of corals harvested to the authorities.
• In return for their efforts, punggawas should be given opportunities to participate in
business and best management practice training programs to improve their knowl-
edge on international market demands as well as on the shipping and handling of
specimens. Furthermore, financial support for holding facilities could be provided.
The granting of funds, training and trade licenses should be contingent upon ongoing
evaluations of the reporting and communication performance of punggawas.
At the level of government institutions and exporters, regulations of the ornamental fishery
need to match local ecological realities, and their enforcement needs to be improved.
This requires better use of scarce resources, strategic links between island institutions and
government agencies, and stronger scientific data on the state of resources. Recommended
measures are:
• Promoting research on the ecology of targeted coral specimens. In line with Govern-
ment Regulation No. 7/1999, local communities should be actively involved in the
monitoring of natural resources. Designing management plans for the Spermonde
coral trade will require an increase of local knowledge about coral ecology and life
history characteristics (Knittweis and Wolff 2010).
• Random, unannounced controls of exporters and middlemen. Instead of trying to
patrol large collection grounds, the scarce resources available should be devoted to
controlling the bottlenecks of the fishery.
• Improved cooperation between regulatory and enforcement agencies, with an ex-
ternal auditing system to combat corruption in enforcement. Punggawas convicted
of bribing officers should lose their trade licenses. Recent efforts by the Indone-
sian government to curb corruption give hope that this problem can be effectively
addressed.
• Better training of fisheries officers to allow them to recognize and distinguish col-
lected species. Currently, misidentification of species hinders the effective control
of quotas.
• Development of a mandatory catch reporting system for punggawas. Similar to by-
catch in fisheries, quotas should include discarded corals. Quotas should be set by
weight or number depending on which measure is more suitable for the species in
question. The granting of licenses should be contingent on accurate reporting, to
be controlled by unannounced point checks. Mechanisms are needed to incorpo-
rate feedback on abundances and fishing pressure in quota setting and regulation
of fishing pressure to ensure that management can adapt to changing ecological
conditions.
• A formal and adaptive framework to incorporate community actors and institutions
into a hybrid form of management that merges bottom-up and top-down regulations
(Cinner and Aswani 2007). The legal basis for such co-management is provided
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in recent regulations such as Law 27/2007 (Siry 2011). This approach can draw on
experiences with incorporating community-based marine tenure systems into formal
fisheries management (Dahl 1988). For fishing grounds in island waters, the granting
of territorial use rights should include assigning the right to island communities to
establish their own use rules and to enforce these. For remote fishing grounds,
the assignment of site-specific collection quotas to punggawas and their fishermen
or to fishermen cooperatives should be considered and jointly agreed-on rules on
permissible fishing technology and benefit sharing be developed.
• Moving beyond the dogma of increasing fishery production as a means to improve
fisherfolk livelihoods. The inclusion of strategies to foster mariculture production in
current fisheries development plans (MoMAF 2010) is a first step into this direction.
However, it still carries considerable risks (e.g., in the form of negative environ-
mental impacts). Additional efforts need to be directed into developing livelihood
options that do not depend on the extraction of marine resources. Furthermore, to
reduce fisheries and other, for instance climate change-related pressures in the island
environments, government agencies should consider supporting islanders wishing
to look for occupation and residence on the mainland with housing, credit, and
professional training.
Conclusion
The Spermonde ornamental coral fishery was found to be a non-specialized activity that
forms part of a wider marine resource use portfolio. Its status as one among many activities,
the lack of non-fisheries alternatives, lack of a local perception of ecological crisis, dys-
functional official marine resource management, and prevailing patron–client ties have all
contributed to a lack of sustainability in the fishery. To improve the situation, strengthening
of the position of fishers and their inclusion in monitoring, zonation, and quota-setting
schemes, helping fishers to independently obtain licenses, as well as finding an adequate
role for the patron–client institution in a form of co-management are recommended. From
the side of the government agencies, this will require the willingness to delegate authority
to the local level, in return for the prospect of improved monitoring and enforcement. The
danger of collusion and corruption between traders and enforcement agencies remains, and
the success of fisheries management will depend on how well these structural problems
can be addressed. Discussions with individual punggawas and fisheries officers indicate,
however, that many are sincere in their willingness to work toward a sustainable ornamental
fishery. In the long term, a well-monitored and sustainably conducted ornamental fishery
which is accompanied by adequately targeted and supported supplementary livelihood ef-
forts could be a key component of a conservation strategy that builds upon both ecological
and socioeconomic realities.
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